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The new FRY president, Vojislav Kostunica adopted a policy aimed at integrating the FRY into interna-
tional organisations and particularly into the United Nations. The international recognition of the FRY
and its integration into international organisations after the downfall of Milosevic does not guarantee
the stability or longevity of the "Third Yugoslavia. " The FRY has in fact been in the process of disinte-
gration since 1998, and the new president Vojislav Kostunica has not reversed this trend. The FRY is
presently in the same political situation as was the SFRY between June and December 1991-namely in
the process of internal dissolution. The question remains whether Montenegro and Kosovo will agree
with this role for Kostunica. If there is no explicit commitment by the Serbs and Montenegrins to live in
one state, then the FRY cannot be a viable federal state.
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1. Introduction
From 1918 until 1991 the South Slaves lived in
two states, commonly known as the "first" and "sec-
ond" Yugoslavia. These two states experienced three
distinct forms of government- a constitutional mon-
archy, an absolute monarchy, and a socialist republic.
The name of this state, counting all slight modifica-
tions, changed eight times. In 1918-1928 it was the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929 it
became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. On 29 November
1943 the communist-led resistance, led by Communist
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) General Secretary Josip
Broz Tito, proclaimed the Democratic Federal Yugo-
slavia (DFY). Following liberation, the Federal Peo-
ple's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was established
on 29 November 1945. The creation of the FPRY co-
incided with formal abolition of the monarchy and the
interdiction to the royal family (the Karadjordjevic
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dynasty) to return to Yugoslavia from the exile in Great
Britain, where they had spent the Second World War.
With the adoption of a new constitutional law in 1963,
the state again changed its name to the Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In 1987-88,jolted
by Serbian nationalism as personified by Siobodan
Milosevic, the SFRY began the process of disintegra-
tion, which came to a close by the end of 1991.1 On 4
July 1992 the Arbitration Commission of the EC
(known as the Badinter Commission) found that the
SFRY had ceased to exist.
2. The Formation of the FRY,
historic background
When in December 1991 the European Com-
munity announced its intention to recognize Slovenia
and Croatia by 15 January of the next year, the Serbian
government quickly declared (on 26 December 1991 )
that "a 'third Yugoslavia' had been formed with Ser-
bia, Montenegro, and the Serbian Krajina in Croatia.'
The territory of Krajina was seized by force from
Croatia in JuneDecember 1991, and it was ready to be
r
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annexed to the new emerging Yugoslavia. Serbia and
Montenegro did not submit a formal request to the
European Community for international recognition of
this so-called "third Yugoslavia." The Republic ofSer-
bian Krajina did submit an application for recognition,
but it was turned down. The Badinter Commission
decided that only the former republics of the SFRY
(Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,
Montenegro and Macedonia) were entitled to state-
hood. On 12 February 1992 Serbia and Montenegro
agreed to stay in the same state, which clamed conti-
nuity with the SFRY. Montenegro, one of two federal
entities, then hastily organized a referendum on 1
March 1992. Of the 66 percent of the population that
voted (the Montenegrin Albanian and Muslim
populations refused to participate), 96 percent an-
swered "yes" to the following question: "Do you agree
that Montenegro, as a sovereign republic, should con-
tinue to live within a common state- Yugoslavia, to-
tally equal in rights with other republics that might wish
the same?"? Serbia did not organize a similar referen-
dum and none of four remaining Yugoslav's republics
ever expressed any intention to join this Yugoslavia.
The final step in forming the new state was made
on 27 April 1992, when the republican parliaments of
Serbia and Montenegro and the rump Yugoslavia Fed-
eral Assembly issued a "Declaration on the Formation
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," which pro-
claimed the transformation of the SFRY into the FRY.
Since then, the FRY has celebrated 27 April as a state
holiday, the "Day of Statehood." The Badinter Com-
mission, in its Opinion No 11, has also recognized 27
April 1992, as the date of succession for the FRY.
The international community rejected the Bel-
grade government's efforts to achieve for the FRY the
same successor status vis-a-vis the SFRY as the Rus-
sian Federation achieved vis-a-vis the USSR. On 19
September 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 777
declared that the FRY could not automatically assume
UN membership as the successor state to the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Gen-
eral Assembly was asked to require the FRY to apply
for UN membership and in the meantime exclude it
from the work of the General Assembly. On 16 July
1993 The Badinter Commission ruled that none of the
six successor states of the SFRY (Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia- Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Mac-
edonia) could claim for itself alone the membership
rights previously enjoyed by the former SFRY. The
Badinter Commission also decided the dates of suc-
cession for each recognized successor state of the
SFRY. Slovenia and Croatia became independent on 8
October 1991, when their declarations of independ-
ence of 25 June 1991 came into effect. Macedonia be-
came independent on 17 November 1991, when it
adopted its new constitution. Bosnia-Herzegovina be-
came independent on 6 March 1992, when the results
l
of the 29 February-l March 1992, referendum were
officially recognized.
The four former SFRY republics-Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia -
decided to apply for membership in international organi-
zations and since have been recognized by the interna-
tional community and have been admitted as members
of the United Nations. But while President Milosevic
was in power, first as the President of Serbia (1989-
1997), then as the President of the FRY ( 1997-2000),
the FRY refused to apply for membership in interna-
tional organizations. The FRY considered itself the sole
successor state of the SFRY, and therefore believed that
it was automatically entitled to positions in international
organizations previously occupied by the SFRY. The
result was partial exclusion from the activities of the
UN and suspension from other international organiza-
tions (including the CSCE, now OSCE).
For eight years the FRY was in legal limbo. The
flag of the defunct Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia continued to fly outside UN headquarters in
New York, since it was the last Yugoslav flag used by
the UN Secretariat, but this was not a flag of the FRY.
This absurd situation of perpetrating the memory of
the non-exiting state had repercussions in the FRY. In
1992-1997 the state holiday of the FRY was 29 No-
vember, in reference the founding day of the Tito's
Yugoslavia in 1943. In 1997 the FRY decided to cel-
ebrate 29 November, but in reference to the year 1945,
when the monarchy was abolished and replaced by the
Republic.
After Milosevic's ouster, the new FRY president,
Vojislav Kostunica adopted a policy aimed at integrat-
ing the FRY into international organizations and par-
ticularly into the United Nations. On 27 October 2000,
Kostunica wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
and formally applied for UN membership. Kostunica
had been encouraged in this matter by Russia" and
France', Serbia's historic allies, which promised him
support." The FRY's request was processed very rap-
idly with no country raising any objection, and on 1
November it became a member of the UN.
In this article we will argue that international
recognition of the FRY and its integration into inter-
national organizations after the downfall ofMilosevic
does not guarantee the stability or longevity of the
"Third Yugoslavia." My central contention is that the
FRY has in fact been in the process of disintegration
since 1998, and that new president Vojislav Kostunica
has not reversed this trend. Using recent historical
analogies to define the current state of the FRY, we
would argue it is presently in the same political situa-
tion as was the SFRY between June and December
1991-namely in the process of internal dissolution.
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3. The Constitution of the FRY
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The constitution of the FRY was adopted on 27
April 1992, together with the "Declaration on the For-
mation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Ac-
cording to the new constitution, the FRY is a federal
state composed of citizens and member republics. In
Serbia and Montenegro, the new FRY constitution was
adopted without any public debate. Only 73 of 220
deputies from Serbia and Montenegro in the last SFRY
parliament (savezna skupstina) voted for it. In effect,
as Nebojsa Cagorovic, a political analyst from
Montenegro, wrote, "the constitution was adopted il-
legally, without a quorum, by the dead legislature of a
dead state'". As in 1918, Montenegro was once again
annexed by Serbia. If the new constitution was to es-
tablish legal continuity between the SFRY and FRY it
had to be adopted by 147 deputies of the Federal Cham-
ber of the SFRY; only in this case could the transfer of
authority from the SFRY to the FRY be considered le-
gal.
The constitution of the FRY was adopted after
the constitution of Serbia (September 1990) and be-
fore that of Montenegro (October 1992). A cumber-
some document (144 Articles) with many overlapping
clauses, it attempts to reconcile two competing claims
for sovereignty-one claimed by the federal units (re-
publics), the other by the federal state. In this regard,
the FRY constitution contains the same contradictions
and tensions, as had the 1974 Yugoslav constitution,
oscillating between a federation and a confederation.
Despite these tensions, the FRY did function as a fed-
eral state, the absence of clarity over the respective
jurisdictions of the federal units and the federal state
being balanced until March of 1997 by the close simi-
larity of the interests between political elites in Serbia
and Montenegro. The Montenegrin constitution (1992)
was adjusted with the federal constitution, but the Ser-
bian constitution (1990) never was. In fact, the consti-
tution of the FRY was an urgent response to the politi-
cal vacuum created by the disintegration of the SFRY
and was adopted in the aftermath of the diplomatic rec-
ognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992.
Legislative power in the FRY is exercised by a
bicameral parliament (Federal Assembly) representing
the citizens (Chamber of Citizens) and the member re-
publics (Chamber of Republics). According to the fed-
eral electoral law, 108 deputies to the Chamber of Citi-
zens are elected from the Republic of Serbia. The Re-
public of Montenegro (with about 5 percent of the popu-
lation of the FRY) has safeguarded its interests through
a constitutional clause (Article 80), providing it at least
30 federal deputies. The Chamber of Republics consists
of 40 deputies, 20 from each republic. This power-shar-
ing agreement was created to avoid the complete domi-
nation by Serbia of its junior partner Montenegro. In
both republics, federal deputies to the Chamber of Re-
publics were elected by the respective parliaments, tak-
ing into consideration the parliamentary representation
of political parties as well as independent deputies. In
reality, the political party that controls the national par-
liament also controls the federal parliament. Until the
24 September 2000 elections, the power base offormer
FRY president Slobodan Milosevic was the Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS). Similarly, Momir Bulatovic's
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) had a majority in
the national parliament of Montenegro until the May
1998 elections. Thus, the federal assembly reflected the
balance of political forces in the national assemblies of
Serbia and Montenegro. The federal deputies were del-
egated by the parliaments of their respective republics
and were responsible to them.
Federal political power in the FRY is exercised
through the relationship between the federal assembly
and the federal government, whereby the federal as-
sembly elects the federal government. The Federal
Prime Minister is the central figure in the federal gov-
ernment and personifies it. The candidate for this post
is proposed by the president of the FRY and has a free
hand in selecting the members of the federal govern-
ment. However, a parliamentary majority in both cham-
bers of the federal assembly must approve the pro-
gramme of the government and the composition of the
federal government.
4. The Role of the Presidency
in the Federal Constitution.
The president of the republic exercises execu-
tive power in the FRY jointly with the federal govern-
ment, and the federal assembly elects both. Although
the constitution holds that the president of the FRY
and the federal prime minister should not be from the
same republic (Article 97), Serbia has not always re-
spected this rule. The first president, Dobrica Cosic,
and the first federal Prime Minister, Milan Panic, were
both from Serbia. Zoran Lilic, the president until 15
July 1997 was from Serbia, while Prime Minister
Radoje Kontic was from Montenegro. Slobodan
Milosevic, who engineered their elections through the
SPS and its Montenegrin counterpart, placed all four
in power. When Cosic and Panic went beyond limits
defined by Milosevic, they were immediately deposed
by the federal assembly, which, at that time was con-
trolled by the Socialist Party of Serbia and its allies.
On 18 May 1998, Milosevic orchestrated the dismissal
of the Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and the federal
government, which lost a vote of confidence in the
upper house of the Yugoslav parliament. Mr. Kontic
had fallen out of favor with Mr. Milosevic by oppos-
ing his plan to impose a state of emergency in
Montenegro as a way of blocking the inauguration of
the new president Milo Djukanovic, a Milosevic critic."
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Milosevic then picked up Momir Bulatovic as a Fed-
eral Prime Minister. The latter had just lost the presi-
dential elections to Milo Djukanovic and was eager to
work with his old ally Milosevic to keep Djukanovic
in check. During his tenure as a Federal Prime Minis-
ter (May 1998- October 2000), Bulatovic with
Milosevic used all means available short of military
intervention to undermine Djukanovic and his govern-
ment. Bulatovic's political loyalty to president
Milosevic did not waver through out of Milosevic's
presidency. In February 2000 Bulatovic deemed that"
president Milosevic was in this moment the best choice
to defend state and national interests of the FRY. Due
to the hostility of the international community toward
the FRY we do not have any other road to take than
that chosen by the president Milosevic.??
Constitutionally, the president of the FRY has
rather limited state power in comparison to the classi-
cal presidential political systems such as the Ameri-
can and the French (not to mention the Russian). Arti-
cle 96 of the constitution regulates the president's pre-
rogatives. The most important functions of the presi-
dent are: representing the FRY at home and abroad,
calling elections for the Federal Assembly, nominat-
ing a candidate for prime minister of the federal gov-
ernment and issuing instruments of ratification for in-
ternational treaties. Article l36 gives the president of
the federation the power to "promote and dismiss of-
ficers of the Army of Yugoslavia." Milosevic has used
this right very often to purge the Army of allegedly
unloyal high-ranking officers. In 1998 Milosevic dis-
missed Chief of Staff General Momcilo Perisic, who
had opposed open confrontation with NATO during
the Kosovo crisis. Milosevic conducted a spectacular
purge of the federal army in the 199111992, when he
was the president of Serbia. According to retired ad-
miral Branko Mamula, himself purged by Milosevic,
130 generals and high- ranking military officers were
sacked from the army in 199111992.10 Milosevic's con-
trol over the army was assured through the promotion
of officers loyal to him (e.g., Generals Nebojsa
Pavkovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic), and by control over
the defense budget. Milosevic deliberately reduced the
influence and strength of the army and built powerful
police forces (the Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti, SDZ).
Personal authority, however, was the most important
building block in Milosevic's pyramid of power, and
rested on the formal and informal networks he had built
since 1997. As Attila Agh wrote, in the FRY" the real
power is concentrated in the hands of an omnipotent
president without any' checks and balances' ". II
It is important to bear in mind that Milosevic de-
liberately tailored the constitution of the FRY to fit his
personal needs. As long as he was the president of Ser-
bia he wanted the Yugoslav Federation to have a consti-
tutionally and politically weak president. A balanced
relationship between the two was not in the autocratic
Milosevic's interest. But the situation changed after
Milosevic completed his second mandate as president
of Serbia in June 1997 and was elected as president of
the FRY on 15 July 1997. Barred by the Serbian consti-
tution from seeking a third term as president of Serbia,
Milosevic succeeded in getting elected by the federal
parliament as president of the FRY, with a four-year
mandate. The 138-member Chamber of Citizens of the
federal parliament elected Milosevic by 88 votes to 10;
the vote in the Chamber of Republics was 29 to 2.
In preparation for assuming the position of pres i-
dent of the FRY, Milosevic had already transferred a
group of his most trusted aides from Serbian to federal
institutions in spring 1997. These included Zoran
Sokolovic (Minister of Internal Affairs) and Nikola
Sainovic (Deputy Prime Minister). These appointments
show that Milosevic had already reinforced the power
offederal institutions without actually changing them.
For Milosevic, the Serbian and FRY presidency
became interchangeable institutions. When Milosevic
was elected the president of the FRY, political power
shifted from the Serbian presidency to the Federal presi-
dency without any institutional changes on the federal
level. Milosevic's proxies, directly accountable to him,
controlled the Serbian presidency and deprived the par-
liament of its political autonomy. Thus Milosevic pre-
served the facade offederalism while assuming de facto
dictatorial powers.
Milosevic's federal presidency lasted from 15
July 1997 until 6 October 2000. Under his tenure the
FRY de- facto lost Kosovo, which became an UN pro-
tectorate for an indefinite period of time when the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 1244 in 1999. As
the president of the FRY, Milosevic strained relations
with Montenegro to the breaking point. By summer of
2000, when Milosevic decided to seek a second term
as a president of FRY, the Yugoslav federation was
completely dysfunctional. In a constitutional "coup"
engineered by Milosevic on 6 July 2000, the parlia-
ment hastily changed the federal constitution (Articles,
97, 98), and adopted a constitutional amendment re-
garding the procedure of the election of the president.
The Montenegrin government rejected the constitu-
tional amendments and its Parliament declared them
null and void. The parliament resolution provided the
Montenegrin government with a legal base for refus-
ing to participate in the federal presidential elections
held on 24 September 2000. This is the reason that the
Montenegrin government does not consider Kostunica
the legal president of the FRY.
Milosevic opted for the election of the federal
president by direct popular vote, in general elections
scheduled for 24 September 2000. His intention was
to enhance the legitimacy and visibility of the post. A
new mandate would allow Milosevic to stay in power
for another eight years. The United Nations War Crimes
Tribunal in The Hague had indicted Milosevic on 27
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May 1999, following the campaign of ethnic cleans-
ing in Kosovo, which he had orchestrated. Staying in
power was the safest way for him to avoid extradition
and trial in The Hague.
5. Supreme and Constitutional
Courts
Two other relevant institutions established by
the federal constitution are the Supreme and Constitu-
tional Courts. The control of the Constitutional Court
by Milosevic was revealed on 4 October 2000, when
in an apparent attempt to keep Milosevic in power, the
Court annulled parts of the contested Yugoslav elec-
tions of 24 September 2000. The Court invalidated
presidential elections and ordered a re-run. Court presi-
dent Milutin Srdic said, "a new election should be held
before the president's mandate expires?". This meant
that Milosevic should serve out his last year in office
and call new presidential election before July 2001.
The popular revolt of 5 October 2000 in Belgrade
forced the Federal Electoral Commission, who previ-
ously falsified the results ofthe presidential elections,
to recognize Vojislav Kostunica as a winner ofthe elec-
tions. Thus, the decision of the Constitutional Court of
4 October 2000 became null and void. The constitu-
tional manipulations engineered by Milosevic and his
stooges demonstrated that the separation of power be-
tween the executive, legislative and judiciary was in
fact nonexistent in the FRY.
6. The Conflict and Cooperation
between Serbia and Montenegro
Because of the ethnic, religious and linguistic
similarities between Serbs and Montenegrins, one
would expect that the new federation would be more
harmonious than the previous one, which included six
different nations. But as Elizabeth Roberts wrote, "the
distinguishing feature of Montenegrin history is the way
it has engendered a dual sense of identity - both Serb
and Montenegrin - giving rise to bitter divisions that
erupted into civil war previously in this century and
continue to cast their shadow today ".13 The cultural
closeness between the Serbs and Montenegrins makes
relations between these two political communities (fed-
eral units) very delicate. The political interests of two
are not necessarily or always compatible with their
cultural and religious closeness. After WWII many
Montenegrins moved to Serbia, particularly to Bel-
grade, where they have occupied high positions in the
federal administration. Because of its similarities with
the Serbs and its complete integration into Serbian so-
ciety, the Montenegrin community in Serbia (140,000
according to the census of 1991) is categorically op-
posed to the independence of Montenegro. It goes the
same for the Serbian community living in Montenegro
(57,000 people according to the census of 1991). This
community is also well integrated into Montenegrin
society. It is the author's view that although Serbians
and Montenegrins share many commonalities they are
two distinct nations, like for example, the British and
American nations.
Milosevic's family reflects well this dual iden-
tity of many Montenegrins. Milosevic's father was
Montenegrin, but Milosevic himself was born in Ser-
bia and it has made his entire political carrier in Ser-
bia. His brother Branislav, FRY former ambassador to
Russia, 14 declared himself Montenegrin and has made
his diplomatic carreer as a cadre from Montenegro,
climbing the ranks of League of the Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY).
The conflict of interest between Serbia and
Montenegro was preceded by a conflict within the
Montenegrin leadership. From 1988 to 1996, two poli-
ticians, Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic domi-
nated Montenegrin politics. They came to power in
Montenegro by staging an internal "coup" in the League
of Communist of Montenegro (LCM) in 1989. In Janu-
ary 1989, Milosevic's supporters in Montenegro or-
ganized demonstrations against the local communist
leadership, which resigned under pressure from the
streets and yielded to those politicians (Bulatovic and
Djukanovic) who supported Milosevic's policy of re-
shaping Yugoslavia along the lines of a tightly central-
ized federation. Both men were associated with
Milosevic's "anti-bureaucratic revolution" and closely
cooperated with the Serbian leadership during the dis-
integration of Yugoslavia. In 1990, the LCM changed
its name into the Party of Democratic Socialist (DPS).
Momir Bulatovic became the chairman of the party and
later the president of Montenegro. Djukanovic was
picked up by Bulatovic to be his prime minister. On 12
February 1991, at age of 29, Djukanovic became the
youngest prime minister in Europe. As a prime minis-
ter Djukanovic served two terms. In 1998 he became
the president of Montenegro. The DPS under the lead-
ership of Bulatovic and Djukanovic became a loyal
satellite of Socialist Party of Serbia, led by Milosevic.
Cracks between Belgrade and Podgorica that
had been carefully hidden during the war in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared during 1996. The
new, fragile peace in the Balkans has revealed differ-
ences between the national interests of Montenegro and
Serbia. With war-time solidarity gone, Montenegro
realized that Serbia ruled by Milosevic remains a pa-
riah state within the international community despite
the Dayton agreement. Montenegro felt that the "outer
wall" of international sanctions imposed on FRY,ban-
ning it from membership in international financial or-
ganizations, was harming its own economy and inter-
national standing. In response, Montenegro began to
92 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
display a "Slovenian syndrome" -to use an analogy
from the previous Yugoslav Federation- in its rela-
tions with Serbia, namely, to press for greater political
autonomy from its senior partner. Like Slovenia and
Croatia in 199011991, Montenegro initiated a process
of dissociation from the federal institutions in 1997.
Slovenian President Milan Kucan has recently ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of Montenegro's right to
the self-government when he declared that Slovenia
"will respect the democratically expressed will of
Montenegro." In November 2000, while receiving
President Dj ukanovic, Kucan underlined, that" 10 years
ago Slovenia used the right to the self -determination,"
and that therefore this same right should be recognized
for Montenegro."
In 1996 a pro-western faction of the political
elite within the Montenegrin ruling party, the DPS,
under the leadership of Prime Minister Milo
Djukanovic, began openly propounding a different
economic and foreign policy from that of the federal
government led by the Milosevic puppet, Radoje
Kontic. Djukanovic suddenly broke politically and
ideologically with Milosevic and Bulatovic to lead the
reform-oriented wing within the socialist party. In con-
trast to Bulatovic (then DPS chairman and Montenegrin
president and Milosevic's closest ally), Djukanovic
almost overnight adopted western values and led a new
generation of young technocrats. Their prime objec-
tive is the economic development of Montenegro
through cooperation with and eventually integration
within Western European international organizations
such as the European Union, the Council of Europe
and others. While Bulatovic supported Milosevic's
hard-line policy towards neighbors even after the sign-
ing of the Dayton agreement, Djukanovic advocated
speedy normalization of diplomatic relations with
former Yugoslav republics, now independent states.
Between 1998 and 2000, the Montenegro's government
has considerably improved relations with Croatia (open-
ing the border crossing at Debeli Brijeg and the Croatian
Council in the town of Kotor) and also with Slovenia.
The latter represented informally the interests of
Montenegro at the Security Council of UN. During the
June 2000 Security Council session that discussed the
situation in the Balkans, the Siovenian mission in the
Security Council distributed to the other members a
document entitled, " Montenegro and Balkan crisis. "
The document was presented as a "non- paper" (i.e., it
does not have the status of an official document but the
Security Council chairman brings it to the attention of
other members at the beginning of the session). In this
document, the Montenegrin government denied the le-
gitimacy of the FRY providing diplomatic representa-
tion for the interests of Montenegro in the UN and other
international organizations.
At the end of 1996 Djukanovic argued that
Montenegro should distance itselffrom Serbia in both
foreign and economic policy. In December 1996 the
Serbian government, in an apparent attempt to mute
unrest caused by its cancellation of election results,
decided to pay pensions, salaries, student grants and
social welfare that had been in arrears. Prime Minister
Djukanovic and his economic advisers feared that such
payments could be made only by printing more money
without reserves to back it. This in turn could trigger a
disastrous hyperinflation, as in 1993. Should hyperin-
flation return, Djukanovic threatened the Serbian gov-
ernment that Montenegro would introduce its own na-
tional currency the perper. However, Djukanovic's
main offence was that he dared to express open criti-
cism of Milosevic. According to Djukanovic, the in-
ternational image ofMilosevic was so bad that his elec-
tion as president of the FRY could only further dam-
age the interests of the Yugoslav federation, and thus
of Montenegro. Djukanovic and his economic advis-
ers realized that Milosevic's alliance with the hardliners
in Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina and grow-
ing violence in Kosovo fueled by Milosevic's entou-
rage, threatened to keep the FRY excluded from sup-
port of western financial institutions such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank for the
indefinite future.
The long-simmering conflict over politics and
personalities between Djukanovic and Bulatovic and
Milosevic came to a head in March 1997. Djukanovic
made this rift public after he realized that his faction
within the DPS could not impose its views over those
ofBulatovic's wing, which still dominated the party's
upper echelons. By going public, Djukanovic took a
considerable political risk. As expected, he immedi-
ately became a target of the Milosevic-controlled Bel-
grade media. Surprisingly, he survived the first attempt
by Milosevic and Bulatovic to eliminate him politically.
During his protracted battle with Milosevic and
Bulatovic, Djukanovic won significant support within
the DPS and even among the opposition Liberal Party
led by Slavko Perovic and the Popular Party of Novak
Kilibarda. Djukanovic's resistance was supported by
independent media in Belgrade and also by the Ser-
bian opposition organized in the Zajedno coalition. On
24 June 1997, at a meeting of the Main Board of the
DPS, 56 of97 members supported Milosevic's candi-
dacy for the presidency of FRY; 10 abstained and 31,
led by Prime Minister Djukanovic, voted against
Milosevic. Although Djukanovic lost this political bat-
tle with Bulatovic and Milosevic, he kept a high pro-
file in Montenegro. In the summer of 1997 Djukanovic
decided to challenge Bulatovic in presidential elections
scheduled for October 1997.
The first round of the presidential elections in
Montenegro took place on 6 October 1997. The rate of
participation was 67.38 percent. According to the offi-
cial results released by the Republic Election Board,
the incumbent president Momir Bulatovic received the
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plurality of votes: 147,615 or 47.45 percent. Bulatovic's
challenger, Djukanovic, received 143,348 or 46.72
percent. As neither candidate won an absolute major-
ity, a second round of voting was held on 21 October.
In the second round Djukanovic won 174,176 votes
and Bulatovic 168,864. A victory based on such a slim
majority foretold a difficult presidency for
Djukanovic."
7. Djukanovic versus Milosevic
(1998-2000)
After becoming president of Montenegro Milo
Djukanovic sought to consolidate his power. Between
January and May 1998, his main task was to mobilize
his supporters for the forthcoming parliamentary elec-
tions in Montenegro, scheduled for 31 May. Mean-
while, a split occurred within the Democratic Party of
Socialists. Bulatovic created the new Socialist People's
Party (SNP), while Djukanovic's wing retained the
party name. Later, in preparation for the parliamentary
elections Dj ukanovic formed a coalition named "For a
Better Life" (DZB). It was a coalition of three parties:
The Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), People's
Party (NS) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). In or-
der to increase Bulatovic's visibility and that of his new
party in Montenegro, Milosevic appointed Bulatovic
to the post of federal Prime Minister in May 1998.
In the parliamentary elections held on 31 May,
the "For a Better Life" coalition won 42 of78 seats in
the National Assembly of Montenegro, while the So-
cialist People's Party won 29. After having won the
parliamentary elections the DPS candidate should have
held the post of federal prime minister. Instead, as we
mentioned earlier, president Milosevic took the loser,
Momir Bulatovic for this post whose party SNP went
into opposition. The DPS considered Bulatovic ap-
pointment unconstitutional. From that moment on, the
Montenegrin government and president Djukanovic
refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the federal
institutions. This is the root of the conflict between the
coalition" For a Better Life" and president Milosevic.
Djukanovic's double victory represented the most
serious challenge to Milosevic's rule since he had be-
come president of the FRY. When asked what he thought
about the FRY president, Djukanovic stated that:
There are two opposing concepts in Yugoslavia.
There is the one that I stand for-full democratization-
which undermines the other concept, that of the charis-
matic leader. I stand for radical economic change and
privatization, an open state toward the world. As op-
posed to this, Milosevic's option is marked by the strong
autocratic personality, quite counterproductive. Time is
on my side."
Under OJ ukanovic's leadership, Montenegro
wanted to assume important state competencies at the
expenses of the federal institutions. This political strat-
egy was forced upon Montenegro by the openly hostile
attitude of Milosevic and the Montenegrin eli te led by
Bulatovic. Milosevic considered the federal state to be
in the service of Serbian state interest. He simply ig-
nored Montenegro's attempt to carve out a separate in-
terests, to which it was entitled as an equal member of
the federation.
The "cohabitation" between Milosevic and
Djukanovic was uneasy, particularly after the
Montenegrin government submitted to the federal gov-
ernment a "Platform Proposal for Relations with Ser-
bia," the aim of which was to restructure the FRY and
radically transform it into an asymmetric federation
with elements of confederation. The FRY, the docu-
ment suggested, should be renamed the" Association
of the States of Serbia and Montenegro ". The Plat-
form was presented on 5 August 1999, after NATO's
occupation of Kosovo. At this moment the FRY was
in complete international isolation and the Montenegrin
initiative was a desperate attempt to escape the sink-
ing ship. The Platform contained many legal provisions
similar to the proposal submitted by Croatia and
Slovenia in October 1990.18 The federal government
and Milosevic completely ignored this document and
did not bother to reply.
From that moment, the Montenegrin government
has accentuated its strategy of dissociation with regard
to the federal institutions. Learning from Croatian and
Slovenian experiences, the Montenegrin government
and parliament decided not to adopt a formal Declara-
tion of Sovereignty or to proclaim outright independ-
ence, since these legal steps would have triggered open
military intervention by VJ (Vojska Jugoslavije). In-
stead, the Montenegrin leadership opted for an indi-
rect approach, or as some analysts have called' creep-
ing independence' . The aim of this strategy was a
gradual build-up of a nation-state. In two years
Montenegro has succeeded in taking over most of the
functions offederal institutions and according to presi-
dent Djukanovic the federal state is now present on
the terntory of Montenegro only through the presence
of VJ and air-contro L''President Kostunica recognized
this reality when he stated that Montenegro is practi-
cally not under the sovereignty of the FRy20 The
Montenegrin government has taken over the monetary
and banking system, foreign trade, customs and taxa-
tion. Montenegro did not introduce its own currency
perper, as it threatened in 1996, but it introduced on 2
November 1999 the German Mark as a parallel currency,
to the Yugoslav dinar, thus reducing the influence of the
Yugoslav Central Bank on its economy. On 13 Novem-
ber 2000 the dinar was completely withdrawn from cir-
culation in Montenegro, and the DM is now used for all
payments and transactions and thus serves as an official
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currency. This means that a Yugoslav unified market
and monetary union has ceased to exist. Other attributes
of sovereign polity have been taken as well, such as con-
trol of the customs regime, creation of a distinct visa
regime, and internal security. In order to neutralize the
intimidations coming from the federal army, the
Montenegrin government has built-up a police and para-
military force of some 20,000 men to counter the 14,000
federal army troops who are based in Montenegro along
with 900 Milosevic and Bulatovic loyalists in the 7th
Military Police Battalion.
On 2 October 1999 the Montenegrin parliament
passed a Law on Citizenship creating a new legal cat-
egory of citizenship distinct from that of FRY.The law
grants Montenegrin citizenship to individuals either on
the basis of parental citizenship Gus sanguinis) or place
of birth Gus soli). The gradual take over of the func-
tions of the federal state on the territory of Montenegro
has created a situation of Montenegrin semi-independ-
ence, which the current leadership is not willing to
concede. These are, as Montenegrin politicians used
to say, the "acquis" of sovereignty that the new leader-
ship in FRY and in Serbia has to accept. While build-
ing a democratic polity Montenegro has made real
progress in the area of human rights, protecting the
rights of minorities-both ethnic and religious-and in
building a civil society. It would be fair to say that
Montenegrin society to its credit has become in the
last three years a distinct society from that of Serbia,
which is after 13 years ofMilosevic's rule at the very
beginning of the process of democratization.
To defend acquired attributes of sovereignty
threatened by the federal government, Montenegro has
also relied heavily on the support of the international
community (European Union, UN, NATO and US). In
the document entitled" Montenegro and the Balkan
Crisis", presented to the members of the UN Security
Council by Slovenia; which offered diplomatic help to
Montenegro, in June 2000, the Montenegrin govern-
ment argued that Montenegro should have access to "
International political and financial institutions in or-
der that it can achieve positive change without the exist-
ing barriers. In this way, Montenegro could represent a
positive model for democratic struggle and forces in
Serbia, and, when the conditions are ready, for an agree-
ment to be made with democratic Serbia on the shape
and content of future relations which would be most
acceptable for the peoples of these two countries, for
peace, stability of the region and the whole Europe "21.
It is rather ironic that after Serbia voted
Milosevic and his cronies out of power, the interna-
tional community deems that the Montenegro 'way'
should now end, and merge with Serbian road to demo-
cratic polity, in order to build together new federal state.
8. The Relations between
Montenegro, Serbia and the Fed-
eral Authorities after the Ouster of
Milosevic
President Kostunica has stated on many occa-
sions that one of his main priorities is to restructure
the federal state and accommodate Montenegro. In his
interview with the Serbian daily Politika Kostunica said
that Serbia and Montenegro should stay together be-
cause" every link that connects Serbia and Montenegro
historically, spiritually and culturally, is stronger and
deeper than what divides them ''22. Kostunica envis-
ages adoption of a new federal constitution to get rid
of the current bogus federalism and, in more general
terms, of Milosevic 's political legacy. In Kostunica's
view, the new constitution will give a clean slate to the
federal state and will enshrine a new federal arrange-
ment between Montenegro, Serbia and the federal gov-
ernment. According to Kostunica, the Union between
Serbia and Montenegro should have a single legal per-
sonality in international relations and one seat in the
UN. The Union should also have ajoint federal gov-
ernment and the president, a single army, a single cur-
rency and common foreign policy. These are, in
Kostunica's words, "the minimal standards of a fed-
eral state ". These views were expressed in the 'Plat-
form', authored by Kostunica and Djindjic and formally
approved by the DOS. The 'Platform' thus represents
the official view of the federal government and the
Serbian government in the negotiations with
Montenegro. Kostunica wants to build a strong fed-
eral state (Bundesstaat), reminiscent of American or
German federalism. The question is whether
Montenegro with its strong state tradition, is ready to
accept this brand of federalism. Kostunica's vision of
the federal state, in its ideal version may look like Ca-
nadian federalism with Montenegro playing the role
of Quebec or British Columbia. The new federal state
should change its name and abandon any reference to
Yugoslavia. Kostunica deems, and on this point he is
in agreement with president Djukanovic, that the "Yu-
goslav idea" is dead, and that it lost any meaning when
two constitutive nations, Slovenes and Croats, suc-
ceeded from the "second Yugoslavia. "23 The new name
of the federal state should make explicit reference to
the Union or Commonwealth of Serbia and
Montenegro. If the citizens of Montenegro accept
Kostunica's vision of the federal state that Yugoslav
president offers them, a big carrot, namely a quick en-
try into European international organizations, and the
place in the European Union awaits them. These prom-
ises were in turn made to Kostunica at the Zagreb sum-
mit of the European Union in November 2000 in
Croatian capital Zagreb. Kostunica went on say" if
we stay together, all doors in Europe will be open to us
"24. If not, and Kostunica brands a stick, " if we sepa-
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rate in an ugly way, with enormous problems, many
new questions will be open and the whole region will
be jeopardized. I am sure that neither Europe nor the
world will look favorably upon such decision. Nobody
wants a potential fire or fires on its doorstep and no-
body wants border changes in the Balkans?".
The positions of President Djukanovic and
Montenegrin government about a new union are quite
different in content and in form from those ofKostunica
and the DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia). They
initially favored direct negotiations between Serbia and
Montenegro, thus bypassing the federal president and
the federal government. The Montenegrin government
wants Serbia and Montenegro to constitute themselves
into two independent sovereign states subject to inter-
national law before entering into negotiations on re-
structuring the federal state. In addition, Serbia and
Montenegro should have two seats in the UN (as
Ukraine and Belarus had during the existence of the
Soviet Union) and separate memberships in interna-
tional organizations. Kostunica and Djindjic received
these two demands, separate statehood and a separate
membership in the international organizations; with
hostility. In reality; Montenegro wants a Staatenbund
with Serbia; i.e., a confederation with some elements
of federation. President Djukanovic wants the new
Union between Serbia and Montenegro to have only
three functions in common: defence, monetary policy
and foreign affairs. These demands were presented to
the citizens of both federal units, by the Montenegrin
government, on 28 December 2000. The new platform
of the Montenegrin government is entitled "The plat-
form concerning the essence of the new relations be-
tween Montenegro and Serbia.'?" represents the offi-
cial position of the Montenegrin government for the
forthcoming negotiations with Serbian government and
the federal presidency. At the end of the negotiation
process between the two federal units, Montenegro will
organize the referendum to seek approval for an agreed
solution, or, if the negotiations fail, to seek independ-
ence. President Djukanovic has promised to hold the
referendum by June 2001.
The first casualty of the' Platform' was the coa-
lition 'For a Better Life' and the Montenegrin coali-
tion government. The Peoples Party (NS), which was
a member of the coalition' For a Better Life', from its
inception, left the government and joined the opposi-
tion. The People's Party refused to support the' Plat-
form' and has boycotted work on drafting a new legis-
lation for a referendum to be organized, after the agree-
ment on constitutional restructure of FRY is signed,
between Belgrade and Podgorica. Dragan Soc, the
chairman of the People's Party and the former Minis-
ter of Justice, wanted the government to cling to the
'old Platform', which was submitted to the federal
government and to Milosevic on 5 August 1999. With
the People's Party out of government, the polarization
of political parties in the Montenegrin parliament over
future ties with Serbia and the federal government was
complete. Two of them, the People's Party and the
Socialist People's Party (SNP), rejected the 'Platform'
of the Montenegrin government, and now both of them
support the 'Platform' that President Kostunica and
DOS offered to Montenegro. Three political parties:
the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the Social
Democratic Party (SDP), and the Liberal Party (LSCG),
have all accepted the 'Platform' of the Montenegrin
government as a basis for negotiations with Serbia and
the federal government. On the other hand Serbia and
the federal government are afraid that independence
for Montenegro will open the way to independence for
Kosovo. The UN Security Council resolution 1244 re-
fers to Kosovo as part of the FRY, and not of Serbia.
Thus Kostunica and Djindjic deem that the interna-
tional recognition of Montenegro will lead to the for-
mal disintegration of the FRY and the subsequent loss
of Kosovo. Serbian political parties in power and in
opposition want to avoid at any cost a situation whereby
Albanians from Kosovo could find themselves able to
convince the international community into terminat-
ing the UN protectorate over Kosovo. To accommo-
date Montenegro and other players in the present con-
stitutional crisis Miodrag Isakov, the chairman of the
Reformist party ofVojvodina (a member ofthe DOS),
has suggested that Serbia and the federal government
accept the Montenegrin 'Platform'. Isakov proposes
that the constitutional changes requested by the
Montenegrin government should be met by Serbia and
the federal government and should be codified in the
new federal constitution. However, he insists that
Montenegro should wait 2-3 years, (with international
recognition), hoping that during these years Kosovo's
legal status could be sorted out. Isakov went on to say
" at this moment Serbia does not fulfill the conditions
for international recognition, because no one knows
what the borders of Serbia are today, and because of
the unsettled legal status of KOSOVO"27.Veton Surroi,
the editor of the Kosovo daily Koha Ditore, proposed
a similar idea. Surroi wrote" I've suggested before
that the final act in the disintegration of former Yugo-
slavia could be played out in ' a Taiwan scenario', in
which all three states, going through a process of in-
ternal consolidation, will necessarily focus more on the
function of the state then on its international recogni-
tion.?"
There is presently in Montenegro a significant
portion of the population which wishes legal changes
between Serbia and Montenegro. According to the re-
cent opinion polls (November 2000), 52.3 percent of
the population of Montenegro favors complete inde-
pendence for its republic". The formal negotiations
about restructuring the federal state have started on 17
January 2001. The first negotiating session between
Kostunica, Djukanovic and Djindjic was inconclusive.
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Both sides clung to their respective 'Platforms' .30 In
the view ofSrdjan Dennanovic, director of the Center
for Democracy in Podgorica (CEDEM), " It is unreal-
istic to expect the federation between Montenegro and
Serbia to survive. It is increasingly likely that, either
trough negotiations with Serbia or by referendum,
Montenegro will become an independent state.'?'
Until December 2000 it looked that the two -
parts- negotiations, between Montenegro and Serbia (the
Djukanovic approach), or three -parts- negotiations,
Montenegro, Serbia and federal government
(Kostunica's approach) will decide the future of the fed-
eral state. Since a new actor has emerged, namely the
UN. Kofi Annan whose main concern is how to resolve
the status ofKosovo, suggested on December 21,2000
holding a UN sponsored conference, in the year 2001,
about constitutional restructuring of the FRY. Mr. Annan
suggested that the FRY should be transformed into a
confederation, encompassing Serbia, Kosovo and
Montenegro". A similar proposal has been put forward,
a few weeks ago, by Carl Bildt, Mr. Annan's special
appointees for the Balkans.
President Kostunica and Branko Lukovac, in
charge of Montenegrin diplomacy, have both rejected,
out of hand Mr. Annan's proposal, though for differ-
ent reasons. Kostunica wants to preserve Milosevic's
legacy with regard to Kosovo. In 1989 Milosevic abol-
ished Kosovo's constitutional autonomy as defined in
the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. He then created a uni-
tary Serbian state enshrined in Serbian constitution of
1990. Kostunica does not want a new federalization of
Serbia. In March 2000, few months before becoming
the president of the FRY Kostunica stated, " The idea
about federal Serbia is a dangerous one. We have had
some legal precedents, which allowed the break down
of the federation [SFRY]. .. Our party [DSS) is advo-
cating the creation of the state composed of the re-
gions, which should have strong elements of self- rule.
Some regions may have a higher degree of self-rule
then others'?'. In the same article Kostunica lumped
together the following politicians; Nenad Canak, a
chairman of the Vojvodina Assembly and the chair-
man of the League of Social Democrats ofVojvodina,
and the author of the document" Vojvodina Repub-
lic"; Milo Djukanovic and Slobodan Milosevic as well,
saying "all three are interested in having maximum
power on limited territory'?".
Basically, Kostunica accused them of being
power -hungry and having a political culture of the
mediaeval lords, thus encouraging atomization of the
FRY. Canak is one of most respected opposition lead-
ers in Serbia and a strong supporter of the federaliza-
tion of Serbia. He advocates the creation of five re-
publics in Serbia: Vojvodina, Kosovo, Sandzak,
Sumadija and Beograd. Canak and his party do not
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support Kostunica's 'Platform'. At the Meeting of the
DOS held on 14 January 2001, Canak's party abstained
from the vote on Kostunica- Djindjic 'Platform'.
Kostunica's Jacobin concept of state is at odds with
constitutionally defined decentralization as advocated
by Canak and Djukanovic. Kostunica seems to favor
for Serbia, and perhaps for the new federal state, the
French administrative division of territory in the' de-
partments ' and 'cantons' . This cannot be a solution
for governing multiethnic Serbia let alone the FRY. The
regionalization of Serbia, if it means its
'departmentalization', is not the proper answer for
managing her heterogeneity. It is rather the Swiss model
of dividing the territory into the cantons, which are
states that Serbia should consider as a model of decen-
tralization.
Branko Lukovac, in rejecting Mr. Annan's pro-
posal for a three- sided confederation, wanted to dis-
sociate Montenegro's future from that ofKosovo. The
latter risks being a permanent crisis spot in the region,
for years to come. In spite of the complexity of the
present relations between Serbia and Montenegro, and
contradictory initial positions at the beginning of deci-
sive negotiations, it seems to us that in the year 200 I
Serbs and Montenegrins will decide whether they will
live in a single state, or in two states.
9. Conclusion
The roots of the present constitutional cnsis
between Serbia and Montenegro go back to years 19961
97, when the consensus between the two national elites
who created the FRY was broken. The conflict of in-
terests between Serbia and Montenegro, and the con-
flict of personalities (Milosevic versus Djukanovic),
are the main causes of the present crisis. We empha-
sized the primacy of conflicting interests because the
conflict between two federal units continues even af-
ter the ouster ofMilosevic. The conflict between Bel-
grade and Podgorica is primarily political and does not
have an ethnic dimension, as was the case with the
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We would
argue that the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro
strongly resembles the conflict between Serbia and
Slovenia between 1987- 199 j35. The rhetoric today in
Serbia among the Serbian political establishment and
media with regard to the Montenegrin drive towards
independence is hostile, as it was during the 1980's
when Slovenia began its drive towards independence.
For the Serbian media the main culprit respon-
sible for the bad state of Serbian Montenegrin rela-
tions is a " secessionist leadership in Podgorica ", led
by President Djukanovic. This negative image of
Montenegrin leadership in Serbia did not change con-
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siderably even after Milosevic 's departure from politi-
callife.
From 1997 on Montenegro has chosen, like
Slovenia 10 years before, the road to Europe as being
the place where its economic future lies. Serbia, by
contrast, was in conflict with the Atlantic community
since 1991, and its exclusion from Europe, after the
indictment ofMilosevic by The Hague tribunal became
definitive. For Montenegro's long-term interests this
position became untenable and a possible future stum-
bling block.
The future of the FRY is presently on the nego-
tiating table and the Serbian and Montenegrin politi-
cal elites are discussing it passionately. Vojislav
Kostunica and Milo Djukanovic, the respective presi-
dents of FRY and Montenegro, have both publicly
stated that the creation of a new state(s) is a real possi-
bility. Unlike Milosevic, who possessed a near abso-
lute determination to use force to preserve the com-
munist federation, Kostunica has promised a demo-
cratic and peaceful solution to the present constitutional
crisis between Serbia and Montenegro over the com-
mon state's future.
Any union between Serbia and Montenegro
should be based on the principles of equality and re-
spect for Montenegrin sovereignty. However, if
Montenegro decides to go its own way, then Serbia
and Montenegro will undergo a "velvet divorce" as
previously performed by Czechoslovakia in 1993. The
international community should accept any outcome
agreed upon by Serbia and Montenegro and approved
by an internationally supervised referendum. Peaceful
divorce through mutual agreement, as occurred be-
tween the Czechs and Slovaks, has not created insta-
bility in Central Europe as some western countries
feared. Nine years after the separation, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic, in following their own paces, have
made considerable progress toward joining the Euro-
pean Union and NATO (the Czech Republic in par-
ticular). Slovakia, after having shed- off the authori-
tarianism of Vladimir Meciar, has accelerated the pace
of its reforms and, is at present well poised to be a part
of the European integration process. Similarly, the in-
dependence of Montenegro does not threaten the sta-
bility of the western Balkans. Srdjan Dermanovic
thinks, "Montenegrin independence would not cause
any serious problem in the region or for its immediate
neighbors. The republic is too small to pose any real
threat to surrounding countries. Montenegro could not
carry through any kind of imperial programme or ag-
gressive policy.'?" The current hostility of the West to
the independence of Montenegro is as shortsighted as
in 1991, when the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia was opposed, thus encouraging Serbian impe-
rial aspirations in the Balkans.
The persistence of differences between Serbia
and Montenegro after the fall ofMilosevic stems from
the structural differences of the two federal units,
though one should not underestimate the determina-
tion of the Montenegrin elites to maintain their inter-
national standing and their "droits aquis" of sover-
eignty. The international community treats President
Djukanovic as a head of state, and his country is a
member of some international organizations such as
the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. It is unlikely
that the Montenegrin political elite, which was re-
warded by the international community for its resist-
ance to President Milosevic and for sheltering the lead-
ers of the Serbian oppositition on Montenegrin terri-
tory, would now accept the role of Kostunica's
'gubernators'. During the NATO bombing of the FRY,
the current Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic lived
in Podgorica, as did Vuk Draskovic, after a failed at-
tempt on his life in Serbia. The Montenegrin elite,
which today governs the country, began to realize af-
ter 1997 that the federal state cannot be only built upon
the temporary consensus of the political elites, as was
the case in 1992. When in 1997/98 the consensus was
lost, the Montenegrin government and president found
themselves in the extremely vulnerable position of be-
ing at the mercy of Milosevic and the federal army.
This time the Montenegrin political elites have an ada-
mant desire to build a state, which they consider to be
the most effective instrument for protecting the estab-
lished political order in Montenegro from the illiberal
Serbian alliance led by Vojislav Seselj. The latter to-
gether with the remaining supporters of Milosevic and
the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ) of the deceased war lord
Zeljko Raznjatovic- Arkan, occupy 74 seats out of250
in the Serbian Parliament.
President Kostunica intends to be neither like
Gorbachev nor Vaclav Havel, who both lost their fed-
eral states. Maybe Kostunica wishes to be like Rus-
sian President Putin in the new federal state. The ques-
tion remains whether Montenegro and Kosovo will
agree with this role for Kostunica. If there is no ex-
plicit commitment by the Serbs and Montenegrins to
live in one state, then the FRY cannot be a viable fed-
eral state. As Vojtech Masny has convincingly demon-
strated, federalism in East- Central Europe in the XIX
and XX centuries were monumental failures". If
Montenegro becomes an independent state, President
Kostunica may follow President Havel's path and be-
come the president of Serbia, as Havel became the
president of the Czech Republic after the disintegra-
tion of Czechoslovakia. The current president of Ser-
bia is Milan Milutinovic, a leftover ofMilosevic's re-
gime. On 27 May 1999 the ICTY indicted Milutinovic
for the war crimes. Soon the post of Serbian president
will be vacant. •
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